Tuesday, September 3, 2013

Non-adaptive explanations as null hypotheses in Evolutionary Ecology


Non-adaptive explanations as null hypotheses in Evolutionary Ecology

 A response to "Dulling Occam's Razor - or the Perilous Principle of Parsimony"

As a general rule, the Graduate Student tries with great conviction to avoid public humiliation. The Graduate Student will spend long hours in the isolation of his laboratory, reading his Advisor's doctoral thesis with furrowed brows, diligently applying the appropriate statistical tests to partially-failed experiments, and avoiding the departmental seminar coordinator as if she had Zaire ebolavirus. Most of all, though, the Graduate Student is motivated to plod along by the terror and anticipation of the Week of Reckoning: the annual (and sometimes mandatory) sojourn to a scientific conference.

As far as the Graduate Student is concerned, all kinds of disastrous things could happen at a conference. A good example of such an eventuality is when the Graduate Student is invited to a conservation with a Well-Respected Member of his Field, usually by his well-meaning Advisor. Typically, the Graduate Student is caught off-guard by this invitation, such that the invitation results in an over-stimulation of the Graduate Student’s adrenal glands. (This is maladaptive).

During subsequent conversation, the Graduate Student is expected to accomplish two things. The first is to make one small - but nonetheless meaningful - contribution to the discussion. The second expectation is that the Graduate Student will not make an Ass of himself. Both expectations are exceedingly difficult to meet.


When is a non-adaptive explanation reasonable as null hypothesis?

I am well-versed in this area, as I have first-hand experience. I was at a conference a number of years ago, as a Graduate Student (I suppose I am still a Graduate Student, as I haven’t actually received my sheepskin in the mail yet). There I found myself in discussion with a Well-Respected Member of my Field. The discussion was going well, at first, but I eventually found myself in an error-catastrophe loop. I was trying, with great desperation, to explain the predicted relationship between temperature and body size, and I eventually asserted that the negative relationship that I expected to observe was based on a physiological constraint that maps body size to rearing temperature… at this point the Well-Respected Member of my Field cut me off, furrowed his brow, and replied:

“But everything is adaptive, if you go deep enough”.

A silence fell between us. I stared at him the way a duck might stare at a mirror. Around us, the drone of scientific murmur persisted, coffee cups clinked, and off in a corner, a fellow Graduate Student rifled stale muffins into his conference handbag. The Well-Respected Member of my Field looked at me expectantly. I became increasingly apprehensive. Then, not knowing how to dabble my next quack, my inexorable devolution from Graduate Student, to Duck, to Donkey occurred near instantaneously, as I blurted out,

“Yeah, you should publish that one in Nature”.

This reply was of course ludicrous, and it was made in an adrenaline-induced explosion of anxiety. At worst, it was unfair, because an association between a penchant for adaptive explanations and publication prowess was implied.

But I think we all have at least some idea of what “Everything is adaptive if you go deep enough” was meant to get at. In retrospect, I think my colleague just wanted to underline the fundamental role that natural selection has played in shaping the biology of all organisms, from the physiological factors governing cellular processes to realization of these processes at higher phenotypic levels. I have no problem accepting this general argument, nor do I think would most biologists question selection as an important evolutionary force in this sense.

But this ill-fated conversation got me thinking: how “deep” can we go before invoking adaptation as an explanation for phenotypic variation is probably ill-conceived? Or, said slightly differently, is there a level at which it is reasonable to believe that the variation we observe is generally the result of constraint? In my view, parsimony helps inform this end, such that there does come a point at which non-adaptive explanations can become a null hypothesis to explain phenotypic variation. Specifically, I argue that for functional traits, null hypotheses for variation among species should be adaptive ones (such that the non-adaptive hypothesis bears the onus of proof), whereas null hypotheses for variation within populations should be non-adaptive ones (such that the adaptive hypothesis bears the onus of proof); interestingly, for phenotypic variation among populations of the same species, parsimony is of much less value.

I was reminded of my ill-fated conversation with the Well-Respected Member of my Field shortly after my PhD defence, in which I was examined by a different Well-Respected Member of my Field: Andrew Hendry. I was thrilled that Andrew agreed to be my PhD examiner. I have the utmost respect for Andrew, as his research on investment per offspring ("egg size") and reproductive allocation paved the way for my PhD research. His work has been tremendously influential, both in the field of life-history tradeoffs and in terms of how I’ve come to think about evolution of investment per offspring. Andrew gave a terrific examination, but he certainly didn’t like the conclusion of my thesis. Motivated partly by this (increasingly infamous) chapter, Andrew has since started a discussion on the extent to which parsimony is a useful tool for evolutionary ecologists, and whether adaptive explanations are generally any more or less parsimonious than explanations that invoke constraint. So, I’m digging in my heels herein, as I attempt to give a reasonable response.

Electrofishing for juvenile Atlantic salmon during my thesis research

Before I recapitulate the conclusions I drew after being told “Everything is adaptive, if you go deep enough”, I should defend the use of parsimony in evolutionary ecology. My view is that parsimony is one of many useful tools that the evolutionary ecologist should keep in his toolbox. Certainly, a blanket application of parsimony in evolutionary ecology is unwise, as parsimony will be more useful in some cases, and less so in others. For instance, the use of “maximum parsimony” to generate phylogenies is reasonable because it assumes, rightly I think, that it is statistically less probable for characters to revert back to their ancestral state after undergoing a change (at least, this is my understanding).

But phylogenies are perhaps a special case in which parsimony is extremely useful. When evaluating the adaptive significance of phenotypic variation, on the other hand, to “express greatest confidence in the simplest hypothesis” is not always a wise approach. This is because parsimony, at least as I see it, is rooted both in probability statistics and scientific reasoning. That is, the plausibility of an adaptive hypothesis (or a non-adaptive one) is a product of both the number of assumptions and the viability or nature of those assumptions. I realize that this is almost like saying that “parsimony” in this context is the same thing as “what I think is reasonable”, which is an objection already raised by Andrew. Notwithstanding, I think the argument I develop below still has merit even if we adopt a more objective definition of parsimony (i.e., relating strictly to the number of assumptions in a model).

I do not dismiss the value of developing a complex explanation or a complicated model as an a priori hypothesis in evolutionary ecology. Many models, no matter how complex, will ultimately prove to be useful even if they are strictly incorrect. However, I think it’s important to acknowledge the assumptions in complex models are often complimentary and difficult to test in isolation, such that this approach, while potentially useful, can also muddy the waters without much empirical justification for doing so. This is a particular frustration of mine, because I believe that this is precisely what has occurred in my field of expertise: a wide range of rather complicated theoretical models (based on largely untested assumptions) have generated all kinds of generalized adaptive hypotheses that are extremely difficult to test. Parsimony will not be an exclusive means of eliminating these complex adaptive hypotheses, but parsimony can and should be used in conjunction with whatever empirical evidence is available to help choose among competing models.

Atlantic salmon eggs vary greatly in size, and there's all kinds of  adaptive and non-adaptive explanations as to why this is...

I also believe that there is some value in developing and testing simple explanations before moving on to more complex ones. In a reductionist framework, testing ideas that incorporate the fewest assumptions will, I think, lead more frequently to an unambiguous result. A clear result can then inform a linear and logical development of an idea, such that knowledge is acquired by the systematic elimination of the unlikely and the impossible. In this framework, the foundation upon which an idea is based is sound, such that any extension of the idea is well founded. Admittedly, some might want to label this notion as something like “misguided idealism”, but my point is that we should think very, very carefully about the number and nature of our assumptions as we develop hypotheses. This is the motivation behind Burnham and Anderson’s information theoretic approach for model selection in hypothesis testing, and I see no good reason why parsimony should not also be a consideration while evaluating the merits of adaptive and non-adaptive hypotheses.

So let us assume that parsimony is one of many useful tools that may help us discriminate among competing hypotheses. Even if this is the case, as Andrew points out, inferring the validity of adaptive and non-adaptive explanations based on parsimony is difficult, because explanations can be difficult to categorize as “parsimonious” or “less parsimonious”. The issue, as I see it, is that parsimony is strongly tied to the degree to which we understand adaptive and non-adaptive processes in the first place. The number (and nature) of assumptions that need to be made, and hence the degree to which an explanation is parsimonious, is directly linked to our understanding of the mechanism we’re invoking. It’s a quagmire, to be sure.

Notwithstanding, I believe that the argument can be refined. To recapitulate what I concluded after being told that “Everything is adaptive, if you go deep enough”, my view is that the extent to which non-adaptive explanations are parsimonious is related to the scale at which variation is identified, or how “deep” we delve into the levels of variation. My argument is a qualitative one, and I don’t think that it will resolve the differences in opinion that Andrew and I have. I do, however, believe that the issue of scale is important, and it might at least provide some insight into the issue of adaptation, constraint and parsimony.

If we consider the mean value of a trait in two different but related species, I think that the majority of biologists might agree that, in most cases, adaptation provides the simplest explanation for the difference (e.g., competition that results in niche partitioning). I think most biologists would agree that non-adaptive processes, such as drift, are in most cases not a simple or logical explanation for interspecific differences in, say, age-at-maturity or fecundity.

Does the extent to which parsimony informs a null hypothesis depend on the scale at which the comparison is made?

However, as Andrew alludes to, there might be far less consensus on what type of explanation is most parsimonious when variation in a mean phenotype is observed among populations of the same species. I think Andrew is quite correct here. Personally, I might venture, as Andrew does, that adaptive explanations are often most parsimonious in these cases, especially for life-history traits. But I think it ultimately depends on our understanding of the adaptive and non-adaptive mechanisms invoked, in conjunction with the demographic history of the population, etc. Thus, even if we accept parsimony as a useful tool in evolutionary ecology, I agree that it is not clear that non-adaptive explanations are generally more or less parsimonious at this scale.

But how much “deeper” can we go before invoking adaptive explanations for phenotypic variation becomes markedly less parsimonious? What about phenotypic variation among individuals within a population? If we’re discussing adaptation in a meaningful way, then I think the argument is that the focal trait is optimal or near optimal, such that variation among individuals represents different individuals converging on different phenotypic optima that exist within a population. This is, in fact, an argument that has been made time and time again in my field. Specifically, there are a number of rather complicated theoretical models which demonstrate that individuals can achieve the highest absolute fitness if they produce a particular egg size in conjunction with the expression of a particular set of other phenotypes, and that (therefore) variation in egg size among individuals may represent adaptive variation. Yet, in the vast majority of cases (especially those in which frequency-dependent selection and adaptive plasticity are unlikely), viewing phenotypic variation at this level as adaptive is mind-numbingly complicated, as the number of assumptions needed to make the model realistic is stupendous. The nature of the underlying assumptions can also be questionable; for instance, none of the theoretical models in my field incorporate the evolutionary genetics of investment per offspring, nor do they consider whether the model is valid under any given population-genetic scenario. Is it not both biologically plausible and simple to expect that variation at this scale represents, say, genetic covariances among traits that limit the extent to which any given functional trait can achieve its univariate fitness peak? Isn’t life-history theory rooted in the idea of trade-offs, such that there is an expectation that not all traits can be simultaneously optimized in an individual? Again, without drawing on specific examples, this argument is necessarily qualitative, but I nonetheless believe it to be a compelling one.

So, if you think that parsimony is at least useful in evolutionary ecology, as I do, then perhaps you also agree null hypotheses for variation among species should be adaptive ones (such that the non-adaptive hypothesis bears the onus of proof), whereas null hypotheses for variation within populations should be non-adaptive ones (such that the adaptive hypothesis bears the onus of proof).

I’m glad that Andrew has blogged about this, and I realize that my own response was a bit tangential and that I did not address all of the issues that Andrew brought up. I think it’s well worth discussing this subject in general, and I hope I am not the last to give my thoughts here on the blog.

Njal

 

Monday, September 2, 2013

Carnival of Evolution #63

Up now, Carnival of Evolution #63!  Step right up!

Our contribution this time around is by yours truly, entitled Evolutionary branching in complex landscapes, on the first first-author research paper from my PhD to get published.  It also has information on a great program for graduate students, the Young Scientists Summer Program at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria, so check it out for info on that!

This month it is hosted by EvoAnth, so in honor of that, here's a little cartoon about our brothers and sisters in Georgia (It isn't new news, but see http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/28/education/28education.html for a sordid tale):


Thursday, August 29, 2013

Guinness says no!


The World Records, that is, not the beer, which always says yes.

Two months ago, I posted a blog about "Hendry Vineyard Stickleback", in which I described a paper that my kids (Aspen and Cedar) and I just published:

Hendry, A.P., A.S. Hendry, and C.A. Hendry. 2013. Hendry vineyard stickleback: testing for contemporary lake-stream divergence. Evolutionary Ecology Research 15:343-359. PDF

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Joacim Naslund added the following comment on the blog:

Have you checked if your kids are actually the youngest published scientific authors?

Guinness Book of World Records website states:

"At age 11, Emily Rosa, of Loveland, Colorado, USA, became the youngest person to have research published in a scientific or medical journal when an article she co-authored appeared in the Journal of the American Medical Association on 1 April 1998."

Then, of course, more recently there was the Blackawton Bee study by a class of 8-year olds published in Biology Letters, but your children seem to be even younger.

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Who doesn't want to be involved in setting a world record, particularly as a kid. I can certainly remember sitting around and trying to figure out which record I would like to break - and here we had seemingly broken one without even knowing it. So I looked at the Guinness website and found that - yes - according to the record posted there, Aspen (age 10) and Cedar (age 7), should hold the new world record. So why not try? I navigated the Guinness system for submitting a record, added all the proof, and submitted. I didn't pay to have it fast tracked though and so the answer only arrived tonight. Here it is:

Thank you for sending us the details of your proposed record attempt for 'Youngest person to have research results published'. Here at Guinness World Records we are always thrilled to hear about new and exciting record breaking proposals.

Unfortunately, after thoroughly reviewing your application with members of our research team, we are afraid to say that we’re unable to accept your proposal as a Guinness World Records title.

Our team of expert Records Managers receive thousands of new record proposals every year from all over the world which are carefully assessed to establish if they meet our stringent criteria: every record must be measurable by a single superlative, verifiable, standardisable, breakable and also present an element of skill.

Whilst we fully appreciate this is not the decision you were hoping for, we trust that you will understand our position. However, if you have any further record proposals please do make another application, we would be delighted to hear from you again.

Once again thank you for contacting Guinness World Records.

Kind regards

XXXXXX XXXXXX


Cedar and Aspen react to the Guinness verdict.
Well, I am not sure who this research team is and why publishing a paper isn't measurable by a single superlative, verifiable, standardisable, breakable and also present an element of skill (as opposed to, say, the longest fingernails or the tallest mohawk or the heaviest onion or the most people to simultaneously apply a facial mask) but there you have it. Maybe I should have paid to have it fast tracked. Or maybe I should take heart in what came after the letter above:

If you feel we have misinterpreted your application, please login on guinnessworldrecords.com and send us an enquiry clarifying your points, we will then review it and respond in less than 15 working days.

I guess I could clarify by pointing out that Evolutionary Ecology Research is listed in Web of Science and that it has an impact factor over 1.0. I could even send in the anonymous reviews and the Editor's decision letter. How about the data sheets with Aspen's scribbling - or the video of Cedar processing at three years old? Or maybe we should just try again - and quickly. We could published in a journal with a higher impact factor, for example. We could even add someone at Guinness as a co-author. These things we can do - and we can keep trying and trying until we get it right. Very soon, however, I will need a new kid. Better get started on that too.

In closing, I would like to reflect on the final paragraph of the Guinness email:

Please be aware that as your record application has not been accepted, Guinness World Records is not associated in any way with the activity relating to your record proposal and does not endorse this activity in any way. If you choose to proceed, then this is will be of your own volition and at your own risk. Guinness World Records will not monitor, measure or verify this activity.

I find it sad to think that Guinness does not endorse scientific research - although they are certainly not alone in that respect. Perhaps I can get Aspen or Cedar to start growing their nails.

Saturday, August 24, 2013

Evolutionary branching in complex landscapes

I've just had a paper (my first first-author research paper, in fact!) come out in the American Naturalist, and it might be of interest to readers here, so I'll briefly discuss it here.  For more, see the article itself (citation and link at bottom).


A "wordle" of this paper.  A nice way to see at a glance what the themes of a paper are!

Let me start with a bit of a plug.  This research was done at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), in Laxenburg, Austria, with my coauthors Ulf Dieckmann and Rupert Mazzucco.  I ended up there as a student in their Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP) in the summer of 2010.  That fantastic experience, near the beginning of my PhD at McGill with Andrew, help to lay a conceptual foundation for my PhD thesis on "The role of heterogeneity in adaptation and speciation".  It was also simply a wonderful and formative experience, thinking and talking about big issues with a bunch of brilliant fellow students while working in a former summer palace of the Hapsburgs.  It was one of the best times I've had in my life – and note that IIASA will be accepting applications for the 2014 YSSP starting this October!


A small part of the schloss, or palace, in Laxenburg where I worked.  Marie Antoinette played in the belvedere tower as a child; it is painted with trompe-l'oeil garden scenes, to make the long, cold winters of Austria feel less oppressive.  Happily, the YSSP is in the summer!  Photo by Ben Haller.

If you want to read a whole lot more about my experiences during the YSSP, you can check out my YSSP blog.  And if you want to see lots of photos of my travels in Austria and its vicinity, you can check out my photo album from that time.

OK, enough of that.  What of this new paper?  For that, I'm actually going to quote a press release I wrote for Am Nat; I wrote it to summarize the paper for a general audience, so it seems perfect to put in this blog, too.



Does complex spatial environmental variation have interesting effects on biodiversity? A theoretical model demonstrates a novel “refugium effect” that promotes diversification.

It is imperative that we understand the processes that generate and maintain biodiversity, so that we can more effectively work to conserve that biodiversity for the future. In one such process, called “adaptive divergence”, spatial variation in environmental conditions can promote evolutionary divergence among populations, as each population adapts to its local environmental conditions. This process can ultimately lead to speciation (in sexual organisms) or so-called “evolutionary branching” (in asexual organisms). Previous theoretical work has examined this phenomenon in very abstract, simple environments. However, the effects of more realistically complex patterns of spatial environmental variation, like those found in real landscapes in nature, have never been investigated.

Using a model of asexual organisms inhabiting complex simulated environments, scientists at McGill University and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis demonstrate that complex spatial environmental variation can promote evolutionary branching through a novel mechanism they call the “refugium effect”. Refugia are created by patchy environmental variation caused by changes in elevation, moisture, nutrient availability, or any other environmental variable. Organisms that have adapted to conditions elsewhere in a landscape can colonize a refugium and survive there, even though they cannot survive in the harsh environment that surrounds the refugium. For example, an oasis in a desert might act as a refugium for palm trees (and many other organisms). Such patchy environmental variation is omnipresent in real landscapes at all spatial scales.

In the “refugium effect” demonstrated in this research, refugia created by patchy environmental variation can facilitate the evolutionary divergence of populations. Without patchiness, the variation in the environment can be too harsh to allow the organisms to explore, colonize, and adapt to different areas. Refugia due to patchiness can promote such exploration, colonization, and adaptation by providing “stepping-stones” that mitigate the harshness of the environment. This result is important for our understanding of the origins of the vast biodiversity on Earth, since adaptive divergence due to environmental variation is thought to have been a major cause of the biodiversity we see today. This research might also be important to the future conservation of that biodiversity, since it suggests that preservation of environmental variation, not just of “optimal habitat”, might be important to maintaining biodiversity.



That press release emphasizes the "refugium effect" portion of our findings, but there's lots more in the paper as well.  In particular, we worked hard to make our model empirically testable, by using metrics of landscape heterogeneity that could be applied to real landscapes.  It would be wonderful if some reader of this blog took up that gauntlet and empirically tested our model's findings in some real-world system!


Three views of one run of our model (click to enlarge).  Left: a complex landscape, generated by a method that we describe in our paper.  Note that there is, broadly, a gradient from red to blue "environment types" across the landscape from left to right, but there is also complex, patchy heterogeneity that has previously not been explored by theoretical models of speciation.  Center: A population of organisms that have adapted to local conditions in the environment.  Colors of organisms indicate the type of environment in which they are most fit; note that their colors match the color of the environment they inhabit to some extent, due to local adaptation, but that local adaptation is not complete, due to dispersal and stochasticity.  Right: The evolutionary history of the population depicted in the center panel, with time proceeding from left to right and phenotype shown on the y-axis (and also using color, as in the other panels).  Note the complexity of the evolutionary history; the central green branch (the ancestral type) went extinct, but the landscape can sustain orange and yellow branches that are quite ecologically similar, because of the pattern of heterogeneity in this particular landscape.

We have lots of ideas for extending this research in the future, beginning with making a sexual version of the model to explore how the effects of gene flow and recombination alter our results.  To me, it's an exciting area of research that tries to bridge the gap between theoretical and empirical views of speciation.  I hope you agree, and thanks for reading!


Literature cited

Haller, B.C., Mazzucco, R., and Dieckmann, U.  (2013).  Evolutionary branching in complex landscapes.  American Naturalist (early view).  URL

Thursday, August 15, 2013

Eco-evolutionary medicine: why cancer is different

At many universities, including McGill, every thesis defense committee must have a “pro-Dean”, who represents the Faculty of Graduate Studies and is responsible for ensuring that the defense is conducted in accordance with university rules and in fairness to the student. The pro-Dean must come from a different faculty than the student, which means that the pro-Dean usually has little or no experience with the topic of the thesis. I am not sure how they normally assign pro-Deans but every once in a while an email goes out asking for emergency pro-Deans. That is, a bunch of thesis defenses are coming up for which they do not yet have pro-Deans arranged – and the email is to ask who might be willing to fill in. The email request usually includes a listing of thesis/departments that need pro-Deans and we are invited to choose one from among them. This allows one to get exposure to different branches of thinking within the university – once I chose to be pro-Dean for a thesis about the spread of militant Islam in western Africa. This time, I could choose between defenses in chemistry, physics, religious studies, medicine, etc. The one from medicine caught my eye: “Translational cancer research: from the bench to the bedside – and back again” by Torsten Holm Nielsen. So I signed up – primarily in the hope of having the opportunity to ask a question that had been in my mind for about six months.


I had better step back a few years. My early research was part of the wave of studies showing that “rapid” or “contemporary" evolution” often occurs in natural populations. Through time, my interest in this phenomenon expanded into “evolutionary applications” – how rapid evolution relates to applied situations, such as natural resource management, agriculture, conservation biology, and medicine. I even wrote two papers about the topic, one titled “Evolutionary biology in biodiversity science, conservation, and policy: a call to action” and one titled “Evolutionary principles and their practical application”. I also enthusiastically joined the editorial board of the new journal Evolutionary Applications that was founded by Louis Bernatchez and Michelle Tseng. I am here interested specifically in medical applications.

Evolutionary principles are now firmly ensconced in medical research and patient treatment, especially in relation to the evolution of bacterial resistance to antibiotics and viral resistance to antivirals. In particular, the use of any new antibiotic is swiftly followed by the evolution of resistance to that antibiotic, which then necessitates the development of new antibiotics. If this weren’t the case, then penicillin might still be the treatment of choice. The same evolution of resistance is also true for drugs designed to treat HIV. For instance, genome sequencing studies have documented the course of mutations that arise and spread to confer resistance to a given treatment. In both contexts, then, the evolution of resistance alters pathogen population dynamics to allow “evolutionary rescue” in the face of a treatment that would otherwise cause its extirpation from the host. In short, the evolution of resistance by human pathogens provides a clear example of eco-evolutionary dynamics.

In each of the above cases, the first part of the eco-evolutionary problem is evolution by the pathogen population within a given host. To be specific, replication by the pathogen in the host is accompanied by occasional errors (mutations), some of which (by chance) show enhanced resistance to whatever treatment is being applied. As a result, the resistant pathogens show reduced mortality relative to the pathogens without the resistance mutation and, as a consequence, resistance spreads over time through the pathogen population. Eventually, the treatment is no longer effective. The second part of the eco-evolutionary problem is that pathogens that have evolved resistance within one host can spread to new hosts, meaning that a new infection in a new host starts from a position where resistance to the preferred treatment is already strong. This, then, is the two-pronged eco-evolutionary problem faced in the treatment of infectious disease – evolution of resistance within hosts and the transmission of that resistance to new hosts.


I have recently had occasion to re-consider this eco-evolutionary medicine problem from the perspective of cancer. Many years earlier, I had heard several talks about evolution and cancer but my renewed interest came from reading two outstanding books: The Emperor of All Maladies and The Philadelphia Chromosome. Both of these books openly discuss cancer as an evolutionary problem. That is, a tumor is a population of cells in which each (or many) of the cells are replicating out of control – usually as the result of a series of mutations that originally occurred in a line of normal cells. Chemotherapy and radiation therapy are designed to kill these aberrant cells but (hopefully) not normal cells. Sometimes these treatments work right away and sometimes they do not. Other times they work initially but the patient eventually relapses. Both of these limitations are the result of evolution by the cancer cells. During replication by the cancer cells, mutations arise that can (by chance) reduce the cell’s susceptibility to the treatment. As a result – and similar to the first prong of the eco-evolutionary problem discussed above for infectious diseases – the cancer cells without these resistant mutations decrease in proportion relative to the cancer cells with the resistant mutations. During this period, the tumors often shrink as the population of non-resistant cells dies and the patient recovers. Eventually, however, the resistant cells have increased in frequency to the point where they cause expansion of the tumor again.



Cancer biology now has the above evolutionary principles firmly in mind. In particular, tumors are often genetically screened to see what mutations predominate and then treatment is based on chemotherapies known to work best against those mutations – this is the so-called “personalized medicine.” In addition, patients that relapse as their cancer evolves to escape the original treatment are often given a planned subsequent treatment that might better target the newly-evolved resistant cells. Eco-evolutionary cancer medicine!

What struck me when thinking about these phenomena is that – in relation to evolution – cancer is both the same and different from infectious diseases. It is the same with respect to the first prong of the eco-evolutionary problem discussed above – evolution within a patient – but is entirely different with respect to the second problem – transmission to a new person. As far as infectious diseases are concerned, the human body is simply a vehicle for replication and spread to other humans. As far as most cancers are concerned, however, their life – and their genetic line – ends with the death of their host. For cancer then, each human is its own independent world – never to interact with other worlds and with a finite life span beyond which propagation will not be possible. As a result, resistance that evolves within one patient will never (with rare exceptions) be transmitted to another person – which by contrast is the defining feature of infectious diseases.

To me, this suggests that evolutionary applications to cancer treatment will ultimately be very different from those to treat infectious diseases.  In cancer, we can – in principle – design a series of effective targeted therapies for the common (and eventually less common) mutations. We can then use those treatments from the get-go, monitor new mutations and treat those with additional targeted therapies, and eventually cure the patient. The unique – and hopeful – part is that the same sequence of treatments should work in the next patient with the same starting mutations – because any resistance that evolved in the first patient will not have transmitted to the next. That is, evolutionary history is reset in each new patient. With infectious diseases, however, the new patient might well be starting from the ending point of the old patient – thus making the personalized treatment protocol much more difficult and the design of new therapies a never ending treadmill.

So this is the idea I wanted to raise at Torsten’s defense. As should be the case for a pro-Dean, I didn’t ask any questions during the defense itself but was encouraged to hear that Torsten and his examiners frequently invoked evolution as a problem faced by cancer therapy. Then, after the committee had asked all of their questions, it was time to ask mine. I gave short description like that above and asked the student if my thinking was crazy. Encouragingly, it seemed it wasn’t. It was also interesting to see – including in discussions later with the committee – that this wasn’t a distinction frequently discussed in cancer therapy. Presumably this is because cancer researchers are not also infectious disease researchers and so they have to deal with the first prong of the eco-evolutionary problem but not the second. Infectious disease researchers on the other hand have not had to think about the first prong in the absence of the second.

The committee was quick to point out some interesting applications of which I was not aware. One particularly interesting one was that some cancer therapies are apparently designed to drive the evolution of the cancer in a particular genetic direction – a direction that can then make it particularly susceptible to another treatment. Kind of like leading the lamb to slaughter or perhaps an evolutionary bait-and-switch. I don’t think this idea is yet in clinical practice but it is seemingly being discussed.

In reality, I suspect that the difference between cancer and infectious diseases probably has been discussed in the literature (perhaps readers of this blog can point out examples) but it was rewarding to have the realization all on my own – and to then have the opportunity to discuss it with the experts. Congratulations Torsten – and good luck in your future endeavors.


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An aside: In discussions with the committee after the defense, I mentioned reading The Philadephia Chromosome, which is about the development of the first serious targeted cancer therapy for a specific genetic mutation. One of the committee members told me that one of the protagonists of that story – Suzan McNamara – had done a PhD in the laboratory of Dr. Wilson Miller, the person sitting beside me in the defense and the major supervisor for Torsten. In 1998, Suzan developed chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML) and had heard about a targeted cancer treatment in development by Novartis. Novartis was taking the usual careful but glacial steps toward testing their new drug but Suzan and others would die before gaining access. In 1999, Suzan started an online petition that was one of the major pushes causing Novartis to speed up production and testing. Suzan was later featured on advertisements for the drug, which was eventually named Gleevec. Afterward – and I was not aware of this – Suzan decided to become a leukemia researcher, was awarded a PhD in Wilson Miller’s lab, and now works as a clinical trial coordinator at Jewish General Hospital in Montreal – where the defense was taking place. (As a further aside, my uncle also had CML and was enrolled in the early trials of the drug that would become Gleevec. He responded extremely well at first but eventually relapsed and passed away several years later. Nonetheless, Gleevec extended his life and greatly increased its quality.)

Additional personal reasons for an interest in cancer stem from multiple myeloma – on both sides of the family. My mother’s father died of the disease in 1965 and was told at the time that no suitable therapies existed. Then, last year, my father was diagnosed with the same disease, which was my main motivation for reading the two cancer books noted earlier. This time, however, a good targeted therapy existed – bortezomib (Velcade) – a proteasome inhibitor that works by acting on the myeloma cells and the cells with which they interact to inhibit plasma cell growth and reproduction and to promote cell death. In combination with cyclophosphamide (Procytox, Cytoxan), which interferes with the growth and spread of tumor cells, my father is doing very well. I am very grateful for this progress but I can’t help but wish it was present in 1965, in which case I might have been able to meet my grandfather.

A grandfather I never met: William Plumer Hooker.

Wednesday, August 7, 2013

Sticklefest 2012 now a special issue


In August 2012, I had the great fortune to attend the seventh annual Stickleback meeting, organized by Katie Peichel and held on Bainbridge Island near Seattle. Here is the blog I wrote about it.

 
Since that time, Katie and I have worked to edit the special issue from the meeting. It appears in my favorite journal Evolutionary Ecology Research. This post is simply to announce the special issue and to make everyone aware of its contents. I first repeat the start of our introductory paper written with great help from Patrik Nosil, Jenny Boughman, and Blake Matthews. Then I list the full contents with links to each paper. Enjoy.
From the introductory article “Stickleback research: the now and the next”

Institutions and programs periodically subject themselves to progress reports and strategic plans. Flattering summary statistics are compiled, exciting discoveries are trumpeted, and far-reaching and ambitious goals and visions are made flesh. At the risk of stretching an analogy, stickleback have become an institution and research on stickleback has become a program, and so perhaps it is time for a progress report and strategic plan. Our goal here is to provide this assessment – or at least a semblance of it. Although summary statistics are easily compiled (‘stickleback’ appears in the title of 1846 papers in Web of Science as of 12 March 2013), we prefer to focus on the state and future of the institution and program by selecting and discussing several major discoveries (the now) and postulating areas where stickleback are poised to make important new contributions (the next).

The occasion and excuse for attempting a progress report and strategic plan for stickleback research was the Seventh International Conference on Stickleback Behaviour and Evolution hosted by Katie Peichel in Seattle from 29 July to 3 August 2012. During the course of this meeting, we heard many talks that summarized the state of various research areas and that were on the cusp on new and exciting approaches and discoveries. In discussing these talks, we realized that much could be gained – for us at least – in summarizing the field and in attempting to prognosticate the future. In conjunction, Andrew Hendry and Katie Peichel commissioned and edited the current special issue of Evolutionary Ecology Research so as to represent the diverse and exciting ideas emerging from presentations at the Conference.

 Stickleback Behaviour & Evolution: contributions from the Seventh International Conference
Edited by Andrew P. Hendry & Catherine L. Peichel
Part I

Mackie Lake stickleback - photo by Andrew Hendry

Stickleback research: the now and the next.
Andrew P. Hendry, Catherine L. Peichel, Blake Matthews, Janette W. Boughman & Patrik Nosil — 2013(2) (
Andrew.Hendry@McGill.ca)

Divergence in thyroid hormone levels between juveniles of marine and stream ecotypes of the threespine stickleback (Gasterosteus aculeatus).
Jun Kitano & Sean C. Lema — 2013(2) (
jkitano@lab.nig.ac.jp)

Pelvic girdle reduction and asymmetry in threespine stickleback from Wallace Lake, Alaska.
Emily A. Lescak, Frank A. von Hippel, Richard R. Bernhardt & Michael A. Bell — 2013(2) (
elescak@alaska.edu)

Female life-history traits in a species pair of threespine stickleback in Mud Lake, Alaska.
Anjali D. Karve, John A. Baker & Frank A. von Hippel — 2013(2) (
anjali.karve@mail.utoronto.ca)

No evidence that stickleback spines directly increase risk of predation by an invertebrate predator.
Kenyon B. Mobley, Rocio Colas Ruiz, Frank Johansson, Göran Englund & Folmer Bokma — 2013(2) (
mobley@evolbio.mpg.de)

Sensory exploitation and indicator models may explain red pelvic spines in the brook stickleback, Culaea inconstans.
Andrew Hodgson, A. Ross Black & Ryan Hull — 2013(2) (
noonemaycomehere@gmail.com)

Spatial learning ability of the threespine stickleback (Gasterosteus aculeatus) in relation to inferred ecology and ancestry.
Peter J. Park — 2013(2) (
peter.park@nyack.edu)

 
Part II

Ninespine stickleback Pungitius pungitius; photo by Kenyon Mobley

Natural selection and the adaptive radiation of Haida Gwaii stickleback.
Thomas E. Reimchen, Carolyn Bergstrom & Patrik Nosil — 2013(3) (
reimchen@uvic.ca)

On Irish stickleback: morphological diversification in a secondary contact zone.
Mark Ravinet, Paulo A. Prodöhl & Chris Harrod — 2013(3) (
mravinet01@qub.ac.uk)

Are Japanese freshwater populations of threespine stickleback derived from the Pacific Ocean lineage?
Lara M. Cassidy, Mark Ravinet, Seiichi Mori & Jun Kitano — 2013(3) (
jkitano@lab.nig.ac.jp)

The implications of pelvic reduction in threespine stickleback for long-term persistence of populations.
John A. Baker, Lauren A. Ackein, David C. Heins, Richard W. King & Susan A. Foster — 2013(3) (
jbaker@clarku.edu)

The potential additive and non-additive benefits of mate choice in the threespine stickleback (Gasterosteus aculeatus).
Carl Smith & Rowena Spence — 2013(3) (
cs101@st-andrews.ac.uk)

Hendry Vineyard stickleback: testing for contemporary lake-stream divergence.
Andrew P. Hendry, Aspen S. Hendry & Cedar A. Hendry — 2013(3) (
andrew.hendry@mcgill.ca)

anyFish: an open-source software to generate animated fish models for behavioural studies.
Thor Veen, Spencer J. Ingley, Rongfeng Cui, Jon Simpson, Mohammad Rahmani Asl, Ji Zhang, Trisha Butkowski, Wen Li, Chelsea Hash, Jerald B. Johnson, Wei Yan & Gil G. Rosenthal — 2013(3) (
veen@biodiversity.ubc.ca)


Part III

Alizarin-red-stained stickleback; photo by Catherine L. Peichel

The Null Hypothesis is Always Wrong

 No two populations are identical for any trait. No two communities have the same species composition. No detectable phenotype is ever compl...